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With the recent (2002) elimination of the longstanding “marketing quota” system that supported domestic 
peanut prices at well above world levels, the U.S. peanut sector is in the initial stages of adjusting to a 
more uncertain, market-oriented environment.  At the aggregate level, some early indications are that the 
adjustment process for U.S. peanut farmers has been difficult, resulting in deep losses of revenue and a 
rapid exit from peanut production by some producers.  In 2003, the value of U.S. peanut production was 
down 30 percent and prices fell by nearly 25 percent compared with 2001.  U.S. peanut planted acreage is 
at its lowest since 1915, and planted acreage has declined sharply in several important peanut producing 
States—55 percent in Virginia and nearly 40 percent in Texas since 2001.  Peanut production is 
concentrated geographically, with a relatively small subset of counties in just 7 States accounting for the 
bulk of output.  As a result, changes to the peanut program have potentially important economic 
implications not just for the individual farm households that produce peanuts, but perhaps for some rural 
communities as well.   
 
At the same time, it appears that adjustment difficulties for many current (and historical) producers may 
be mitigated by a number of factors, including:  
 
•  an already diversified farm enterprise structure, with peanut (harvested) acreage accounting for an 
average of only 20 percent of peanut farmers’ overall cropland, and a substantial share—72 
percent—of total household income already coming from off farm sources; 
•  lower production costs for some producers stemming from policy-induced reductions in factor or 
input costs (e.g. land rental rates, seed prices); and 
•  government revenue support and asset-loss compensation for current and historical peanut 
producers.    
 
It appears that one of the main difficulties faced by U.S. peanut producers following the elimination of the 
marketing quota system has been the loss of price stability, and a lack of price transparency and price 
discovery mechanisms under the new peanut program.  Sources of price information and risk 
management tools—such as futures markets—are not available to peanut producers.  Marketing 
alternatives may also be limited by a concentrated market structure at the buyer/processor level.   
 
Beyond detailing the more aggregate-level indicators of market adjustment, examining the adjustment 
experience and strategies of peanut producers at the household/farm enterprise level represents an 
opportunity to identify policy and market factors that facilitated or hindered adjustment, and to inform 
producers and policy-makers contemplating reform in other commodity programs.  In particular, other 
U.S. commodities that are geographically concentrated or have a similar program history of 
production/import controls (tobacco, sugar, dairy) could draw lessons from the experience of peanut 
producers.  Variations by region, demographic and household financial characteristics, and other factors 
such as institutional setting—market structure, trading/price discovery institutions, macroeconomic 
  1context or market orientation of the economy—are relevant to the analysis of policy reform both in the 
United States and other countries.   
 
1  Overview of Policy Change 
 
In May 2002, the passage of the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act (2002 Act) substantially 
overhauled the U.S. peanut program, replacing a marketing quota system with a set of supports similar to 
those available to producers of other crops such as grains and cotton.  These changes reduced revenue 
support and price stability for most peanut farmers and made production and marketing decisions more 
market oriented. 
 
For more than half a century, the price of U.S. peanuts destined for domestic edible consumption (quota 
peanuts) have been supported by marketing quotas that restricted the domestic supply, and required all 
non-quota (“additional”) peanuts to be exported or sold into the lower value crush (oil and meal) market.  
Under the 1996 Farm Act, the annually established marketing quota (set at 1.18 million short tons for the 
2001/02 crop year) was designed to support quota peanut prices at a level equal to a government 
established quota loan rate of $610 per ton during the 1996-2002 crop years—significantly above 
estimated world prices ranging from $321-$462 per ton during 1996-2000.   Domestic prices were further 
protected by import restrictions, with tariff rate quotas of approximately 57 thousand metric tons that 
filled each year, but prevented further imports with over-quota tariffs exceeding 100 percent.  Marketings 
of nonquota (additional) peanut production were eligible only for a lower loan rate of $132 per ton in 
2001-02.  Although there have been a number of gradual changes to the program over the years, the 
central component of the program—production limitations—was established in the 1930s.  Since 1996, 
the program was intended to operate at “no-net cost” to the government, with higher domestic prices 
acting as a transfer from peanut consumers, rather than all taxpayers, to producers. 
 
Under the 2002 Farm Act, all producers—whether former quota holder or not—are now allowed to 
market their peanuts for domestic edible consumption and are eligible for marketing assistance loans (a 
per-unit revenue floor) at a rate of $355 per ton.  Producers with a history of peanut production (quota or 
non-quota) are also eligible for direct payments of $36 per ton and counter-cyclical payments when prices 
are below a $495 per ton (less direct payments) target price.  Producers eligible for direct and counter-
cyclical payments do not have to produce peanuts to receive these benefits and are required only to keep 
their land in approved agricultural uses (e.g. crop production, fallow, conservation programs).  In 
addition, quota holders were eligible for a peanut quota buyout amounting to $1,100 per short ton.   
 
-------------------BOX: Minor Modifications made to Peanut Program in 1996 Farm Act----------------- 
 
The 1996 Farm Act did not fundamentally alter the U.S. peanut program, but several modifications 
effectively lowered income potential from peanut production.  Among the more significant were those 
affecting the quota support price and the quota itself – the amount producers could market for domestic 
food use. 
 
The quota support price was lowered from $678 per short ton during 1995 to a fixed $610 per ton during 
the 1996-2002 crop years.  The quota poundage was set annually at the projected level of U.S. food and 
related use demand, and there was no longer a required minimum quota (as in previous legislation).   
 
For the 1991-95 crops, USDA was required to set the quota amount at a minimum of 1.35 million short 
tons, regardless of anticipated domestic food demand.  The quota for the 1998 through 2002 crop years 
has been set at 1.18 million short tons (not including a separate quota for seed peanuts).  In addition to 
lowering the support price, the 1996 Farm Act eliminated an automatic escalator, which allowed the 
support price to increase annually by up to 5 percent, based on the previous year’s production costs.  
  2These changes were intended to ensure that the peanut program operated at no net cost to the government.  
If the quota amount and support price had been left unchanged at the higher levels, it is possible that 




1.1  Expected Impact of Policy Change on Production Incentives 
 
The expected impact on aggregate peanut production is not entirely clear, and it’s possible that the longer 
term adjustment could involve relatively small overall changes in production, but eventually lead to 
significant shifts in production away from traditional growing areas.  The quota system restricted not only 
the supply of quota peanuts, but limited the movement (transfer) of quota production to different—
potentially lower-cost—areas in the same or other States.  It’s therefore essential to distinguish between 
adjustment at the aggregate level (e.g. national or state-level production) and at the level of the household 
and rural community.  At the micro (farm household) level, the impact may vary by demographic 
characteristics (age of operator, level of education) and financial indicators (leverage, farm size, farm 
organization, owner/renter, farm enterprise diversification, and off-farm income).  In general, producers 
whose variable costs of peanut production exceed market prices plus any marketing loan benefits would 
be expected to exit peanut production rapidly, and those with total costs exceeding revenues to exit more 
gradually.  
 
In addition, changes in production incentives created by the new program would be expected to vary 
among different types of producers – quota holders, producers of “additionals,” and potential new 
entrants.   
 
Broadly speaking, those producers who previously produced quota peanuts have faced lower market 
prices and/or combined market price and marketing loan program earnings, reducing production 
incentives.  Planting decisions are now guided by the higher of market prices or the new $355 per ton loan 
rate, rather than by the old $610 per ton quota loan rate.  Other sources of revenue, though not tied to 
current production mix, include the direct, counter-cyclical, and quota buyout payments.   
 
A second group of producers are those who previously grew “additional” (non-quota) peanuts.  These 
producers were producing mostly for export and were likely receiving prices well above the additional 
loan rate of $132 per ton, but less than the quota loan rate of $610 per ton.  The world (export) price—
ranging between $321 and $462 per ton during 1996-2000—needed to exceed the average variable costs 
of producers growing exclusively additional peanuts to induce production.  The extent to which domestic 
market prices or the new peanut loan rate varies from prices received under the previous system, will 
determine the change in production incentives faced by these producers.  Revenues for these producers 
would also be augmented by direct and potential (depending on market prices) counter-cyclical payments. 
 
A third group would be new producers with no history of peanut production.  For these farmers, the new 
legislation may result in new production incentives if they perceive market prices or marketing assistance 
loan benefits as superior to other crops, or superior to the additionals loan rate under previous legislation. 
 
1.2  Trade Agreements and Peanut Processors Important Sources of Policy Change 
 
The most evident source of pressure underlying the transformation of the peanut program are the 
commitments made by the U.S. to gradually liberalize peanut imports under the Uruguay Round 
Agreement on Agriculture (URAA) and North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in the mid-
1990s.   
 
  3Prior to the 1994 URAA and the NAFTA—which became effective the same year—U.S. peanut imports 
were limited to a specific and very low absolute level under Section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment 
Act of 1933.  The permitted import level represented barely one-tenth of 1 percent of domestic food 
consumption in 1993.  This limit was designed to prevent lower priced peanut imports from undermining 
the U.S. domestic support price program. 
 
Without limitations on imports, the price support program for edible peanuts would not have been 
sustainable at the quota loan rate and world prices prevailing prior to the passage of the 2002 Farm Act.  
Peanut processors and shellers would have sought to avoid paying high prices (at or above the $610 per 
ton quota loan rate) by increasing imports of lower priced peanuts from abroad.  If unrestricted imports 
had been allowed, a large portion of domestic quota peanuts would have gone unsold and forfeited to the 
Commodity Credit Corporation.  This would have required either a substantial cut in the domestic 
production quota level or a lowering of the quota support price closer to world prices in ensuing years. 
 
However, under the URAA and NAFTA, the U.S. opened its market to limited, but gradually increasing, 
quantities of peanut imports through a tariff-rate quota (TRQ) system.  Under the URAA, the U.S. 
replaced the import quota with a TRQ, permitting almost 53 thousand metric tons of peanut imports 
(about 7 percent of domestic food use) per year at a lower within-quota tariff rate.  Prior the 2002 Farm 
Act, the TRQ filled quickly each year, but a much higher over-quota tariff rate prevented significant 
imports beyond the quota level.  Under current WTO commitments, the TRQ level for all peanut imports 
except those coming from Mexico is scheduled to remain fixed.  Under the NAFTA agreement, though, 
Mexico’s quota is scheduled to increase yearly to a (still very low) level of 4,815 metric tons in 2007, but 
then become completely unrestricted and tariff free beginning in 2008.  Although Mexico is small 
producer, averaging 130,000 – 160,000 metric tons of production, it is likely that incentives to produce 
and export peanuts to the United States as the TRQ expires would have placed growing pressure on the 
U.S. peanut program as it existed prior to the changes enacted in 2002.   
 
According to Jurenas (2002), the new program reflects an approach proposed by many peanut farmers in 
the Southeast (the largest peanut producing region) and some in the Southwest who were concerned that 
the quota system could not be defended much longer against opponents (food manufacturers and those 
ideologically opposed to government management of a food commodity) seeking to reform the program.  
These producers also recognized that changes were needed to address competitive pressures from trade 
agreements, particularly NAFTA, and that additional budget (government) resources made available to 
peanut producers could facilitate a policy change. 
 
2  Overview of U.S. Peanut Sector 
 
At the national level, peanuts are a relatively minor crop, with a farm-level value of production averaging 
$950 million during 1999-2001—about 1 percent of the value of total “principle crop” production in the 
United States, and about 5 percent the value of corn production – the leading U.S. crop by value of 
production.   
 
At the same time, peanut production is concentrated in a small number of states and is a key contributor to 
the value of farm production in some local economies.  Virtually all peanut production takes place in just 
9 States in 3 regions: the Southeast (Georgia, Alabama, Florida, and South Carolina), with 60 percent of 
national production during 1999-2001; the Southwest (Texas, Oklahoma, and New Mexico), with 28 
percent; and the Virginia-North Carolina region, with 12 percent.  Georgia and Texas are the two leading 
producers, with over 60 percent of total production.  The most recent Census of Agriculture data available 
indicates that there were 12,221 farms producing peanuts nationally, down from 16,194 in 1992. 
 
  4 
 
As an indicator of local/regional economic importance, peanut production accounted for as much as 21 
percent of the value of all crop production in Georgia, and over 17 percent in Alabama (1997 Census, 
figure 1).  In about one-quarter of peanut producing counties, income from peanut production accounts 
for more than one-half of overall farm receipts (Census of Agriculture).   Although peanut farms tend to 
have a fairly diversified enterprise structure, with peanut harvested acres accounting for only 20 percent 
of the average farm’s cropland acres (15 percent of operated acres) in 2002, peanuts were a relatively high 
value crop, accounting for about 27 percent of the farms’ value of production.  For most peanut producing 
States, though, peanuts accounted for less than 8 percent of the States’ overall value of crop production 
(1997 Census). 
 















3  Initial Response is Lower Prices, Revenues, and Plantings but Farm Characteristics and 
other Program Benefits May Ease Adjustment 
 
The recent passage of the 2002 Farm Act and limited recent data on farm household financial 
performance make it difficult to characterized the response of peanut producers to policy change in 
anything but the broadest terms, but price and revenue data clearly indicate that prices and revenues 
dropped substantially from the levels prevailing before 2002.  Reflecting the increased competition in the 
domestic market, prices fell from a range of about 23-28 cents per pound during 1996-2001 to 17-18 cents 
per pound during 2002-2003 (figure 2).  Similarly, revenues from peanut production fell from an average 
of over $1 billion during 1996-2001 to about $650 million in 2002-2003, a 35 percent decline.  Although 
planted acreage remained stable or even increased in the major peanut producing States of the Southeast, 
overall plantings in the U.S. during 2003 were the lowest since 1915, and there were steep declines in 
Virginia and Texas, where plantings fell 55 percent and nearly 40 percent, respectively, since 2001 (figure 
3).  Much of the decline in Texas, however, appears to be tied to reduced coverage from federally 
subsidized crop insurance.  With high abandonment (acres planted but not harvested) rates in 2000 and 
2001—averaging over 30 percent in Texas—the 10-year average yields (per planted acre) used to 
determine coverage levels have declined, making it more risky to plant peanuts in subsequent years.  
Abandonment in Texas declined to 14 percent in 2002 and is projected at less than 8 percent in 2003, 
probably reflecting fewer plantings in riskier dry land (un-irrigated) areas.  In Virginia, the decline in 
planted acres appears to be related to high cost of producing peanuts in that State, reflecting 
uncompetitive production.   
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Although the large declines in prices and revenues—and the relatively dramatic reduction of planting in 
certain States—point to a difficult adjustment, a number of broad indicators of farm structure and 
financial statements indicate that the impacts on household income (and rural communities) may not be as 
severe as on the surface, underscoring the importance of including whole-farm and off-farm income in 
any assessment of program change impacts.  A diversified farm enterprise, a significant share of 
household income from off farm sources, potentially lower production costs, and new sources of 
government payments all have the potential to facilitate adjustment to the elimination of the peanut quota 
system. 
 
•  Enterprise diversification and off-farm income 
 
Peanuts are grown in only a few States and peanut production is concentrated in a relatively small 
group of counties in each State, but as noted previously, peanuts account for a small share of most 
peanut producing States’ overall crop revenue, so the potential loss of income from reduced peanut 
production would have a fairly diffuse impact at the State level.  In addition, even in areas where 
peanut production contributed a substantial share of on-farm revenues, the average peanut grower 
planted only about 20 percent of cropland acres (15 percent of operated acres) to peanuts, indicating a 
diversified crop mix.  Peanuts are typically grown in a 3-4 year rotation on farms also growing cotton, 
soybeans, corn, wheat, hay, tobacco, and other crops.  In fact, the majority of peanut farmers 
identified crops other than peanuts as the principal crop for their farm, most often citing cotton or 
tobacco.  Thus, for many producers, a transition away from peanut production would likely entail 
increased emphasis on crops already grown on the farm, reducing potential capital expenditures and 
investment in managerial “know-how” that would be required in a switch to producing crops not 
traditionally raised by that farmer. 
 
Furthermore, as with many other farm households, off farm income of peanut growers accounted for 
the majority of total household income.  In 2002, off farm income represented 72 percent of total 
household income, a number that is fairly typical of many farms throughout the United States.   
Combined with a fairly diversified farm enterprise structure, this could temper the income effects of 
policy change on peanut farmers and peanut growing communities. 
 
•  lower production costs from lower factor/input costs 
 
Under the peanut quota system, quota rights were inherited and could not be sold, but could be leased 
or rented.  Originally, the quota peanuts had to be grown on the land of the quota holder, but 
gradually farmers were permitted to rent quota to produce peanuts within the same county and, with 
some restrictions, elsewhere in the State.  According to detailed surveys of peanut producers—last 
conducted by USDA in 1995—60 percent of quota rights were cash or share-rented, with the 
remainder operated by the quota holder.  This varied by region, with 77 percent of quota rights rented 
in the Virginia-North Carolina region, but only 39 percent rented in the Southern Plains (Southwest).   
Thus, for those renting quota rights, the elimination of the quota system represents a reduction in 
production costs partly offsetting lower income from the loss of sales at the quota support price. 
 
Production cost data from 2001 indicate that the average quota rent paid in the U.S. was $83.47 per 
acre, more than 25 percent of the average operating (variable) cost of production for that year 
($319.67).  Under the new farm program, these costs no longer apply, effectively lowering production 
costs for the majority of peanut producers who were renting quota rights.
1  In addition, another 
                                                 
1 Quota rents are categorized by USDA as “allocated overhead” rather than an operating cost, but the elimination of 
the quota rent will nevertheless result in reduced expenditures for those previously renting quota. 
  8indicator of reduced costs resulting from the program change is the cost of peanut seeds for planting.  
In 2001, the cost of seed amounted to over $73 per acre.  But reflecting the fact that farmers no longer 
had to pay prices tied to separate quota on seed peanuts, prices had dropped by one-third by 2003, 
representing another $24 per acre reduction in operating expenses (7.5 percent of total operating costs 
in 2001). 
 
According to Agricultural Resource Management Survey (ARMS) data, the average 2001 total cost of 
peanut production in the U.S. was $740/acre ($320 operating cost/acre).  Based on average yields that 
year, this amounts to $240/ton in operating costs and $554/ton in total costs.  Per-unit operating costs 
were $299/ton in the Prairie Gateway, $232/ton in Alabama-Georgia, and $233/ton in Virginia-North 
Carolina, compared to the loan rate of $355/ton.  By itself, then, the new $355 per ton marketing loan 
rate for peanuts provides a net return above operating expenses for most producers.
2  For the U.S., 
though, per acre returns above total costs were negative in both 2000 and 2001.  Assuming this 
pattern holds true in the future, even with the potentially lower costs noted above, there may be a 
gradual reduction in the number of farms growing peanuts. Consequently, producers with operating 
costs exceeding expected revenue are likely to rapidly exit peanut production, but others may exit 
more gradually as fixed costs—particularly those tied uniquely to peanut production (such as 
specialized harvesting equipment)—fully depreciate.   
 
•  Other program benefits  
 
For quota holders, peanut prices were fixed at a high level, with stable expectations and little risk 
except yield risk.  Under the new legislation, the price (per unit revenue) floor was reduced from $610 
per ton to $355 per ton, but the 2002 Farm Act also compensated historical peanut producers with 
additional revenues in the form of fixed direct payments, potential (depending on prices) counter-
cyclical payments (CCPs), and compensation to quota holders for the loss of asset value.  USDA 
program benefits to current and historical peanut producers—principally CCPs, direct payments, and 
marketing assistance loans—are expected to amount to $1.57 billion over 6 years ($260 million per 
year), in addition to the quota buyout compensation of $1.3 billion (CBO, May 2002, as cited in 
Jurenas, 2002). 
 
4  Price Discovery and Market Structure Complicate Adjustment 
 
In addition to reduced prices and lower revenues for many peanut producers, particularly former quota 
owners, one of the principal difficulties faced by producers adjusting to the new policy regime has been a 
lack of price transparency and price discovery mechanisms—a problem related to the lack of cash 
markets and marketing alternatives commonly available to producers of bulk commodities such as corn, 
soybeans, and wheat.  The problem is compounded by an apparently concentrated (oligopsonistic) market 
structure in the peanut shelling industry—typically the first buyers of peanuts.   
 
Currently, there are only 10 active shelling companies, down from 45 in the early 1980s and 92 in 1970.  
Two companies, Golden Peanut Company and Birdsong Peanuts now control about 73 percent of 
purchases and two-thirds of peanut buying points.  It is also reasonable to assume that information 
asymmetries exist, with shellers having better market information and greater resources than peanut 
producers.  In contrast, peanut producers are more dispersed and have limited marketing alternatives, a 
problem exacerbated by lack of appropriate on-farm storage facilities and the perishability of the crop.  
Previously, 3 regional cooperatives under the quota system administered the program and acted as 
countervailing power to purchasers/first buyers, but the current role of these cooperatives is unclear.   
                                                 
2 This data is based on detailed surveys of peanut producers made in 1995, and updated to reflect changes in various 
price indices.  A new ARMS of peanut producers is being prepared for 2004. 
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As far back as the early 1980s Miller (1981) noted that it was reasonable to assume some degree of 
market power favoring peanut processors and millers over farmers, and that 
 
“this possibility points to important policy considerations concerning the role of market 
organization and price discovery mechanisms.  In the event of a free market for peanuts, 
important policy decisions should include: 
 
1.  Clarification of the price discovery role of government sponsored producer associations 
  as marketing cooperatives for commercial farmers’ stock peanuts. 
2.  Establishment of price reporting for spot market peanut transactions. 
3.  Exploration of price discovery by electronic markets and futures contracts. 
4.  Establishment of farm storage, loan and education programs. 
5.  Study feasibility and funding sources for farmer marketing cooperatives for selling 
peanuts.” 
 
An earlier study by Vell et al. (1978) also pointed out that, with domestic prices having been determined 
by the government—rather than a free market process—since the government peanut program began, 
little is known about how price determination will take place in a more market oriented system.  In 
addition, with peanut production considered relatively cost intensive and technology specific compared to 
many other crops, it’s especially important for producers to have marketing alternatives and/or price 
stability to manage risk.   
 
It appears that the predominant price-risk management strategy adopted by peanut farmers since 2002 is 
contract production.  Although contract production is common among many other agricultural 
commodities (tobacco, poultry, fruits and vegetables)—and was typical for farmers producing 
“additional” peanuts for exports—the lack of other marketing options, and perhaps a perceived lack of 
bargaining power, could be a source of frustration to peanut farmers.   
 
Some observers believe that the success of the new marketing loan program for peanuts will depend on 
government or private efforts to develop and provide accurate and timely price information to improve 
price discovery and increase market transparency.  For major crops, commodity markets/exchanges 
typically provide this price information, but it appears that a lack of potential trade volume in the peanut 
market may be a disincentive to establishing a commodity market for peanuts.  The USDA and various 
news and commodity services do report U.S. and international prices, but this information is often felt to 
be untimely, not directly reflective of farm-level prices, or is based on incomplete information.   
Developing new marketing options and providing timely and accurate price information is clearly an 
important consideration for any policy reform involving a transition from government administered to 
market oriented price determination. 
 
In addition to further examining potential methods of improving the price discovery process and risk 
management options for peanut producers, continuing research on the impacts of changes in the peanut 
program will focus on a more detailed investigation of how the farm household/enterprise adjustment 
experience varied by region, farm structure, and demographic and financial characteristics.  In 2004, the 
Agricultural Resource Management Survey, conducted by USDA, will include a detailed survey of peanut 
producers, offering the opportunity to measure the financial performance and well-being of these 
producers, and explore the consequences of the program changes on current and future decisions.  Other 
key issues worthy of investigation include: What steps have producers taken to improve marketing power, 
such as through the development of voluntary marketing cooperatives or vertically integrating into 
downstream processes such as shelling and manufacturing?; what is the role of market structure in the 
distribution of surplus captured and to what extent does buyer concentration hinder price transmission 
  10from the retail to farmer level? What are the options and implications of greater government involvement 
in the price determination process, such as through the establishment of marketing orders or marketing 
boards?   
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